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OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Ronald Soobrian petitions for review of a final order of removal. Although he was
twice granted protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) by the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”), the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed each time
and ordered him removed. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that Soobrian was
not entitled to withholding of removal. In his petition, Soobrian further argues that he
was denied due process of law under the Fifth Amendment when he was forced to
proceed at the removal hearing without an indefinite continuance or a determination of
his competency. We grant the petition for review with respect to the CAT claim only and
uphold the BIA’s rulings in all other respects.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
This case has a long history, and we repeat only those facts necessary to resolve

the issues before us.
A.

Soobrian’s life prior to the current immigration proceedings
2

Soobrian is a lawful permanent resident of the United States who entered it on
May 10, 1974, when he was eight years old. He is a native of Guyana but has remained
continuously in the United States since that time. His parents live in the United States
and there is no one to look after him in Guyana.
Soobrian developed mental health issues in his teenage years, leading to bizarre
behavior, frequent confrontations with authority, and several minor criminal matters.
During this time, he was in and out of psychiatric hospitals. Although his parents
attempted to get appropriate treatment for him, he ended up frequently living on the
streets of New York City, ranting that he was Jesus, running naked in the streets, and
acting out in a psychotic manner.
In early 2002, he was convicted in New York state court of second degree
attempted assault and was sentenced to 18–36 months’ imprisonment. This was a result
of a guilty plea entered after he was found mentally competent to stand trial in spite of his
longstanding mental illness (and two prior determinations that he was mentally
incompetent to stand trial). The underlying incident involved Soobrian hitting a male
victim in the head with a wooden stick, resulting in a laceration and swelling near the eye.
In late 2002, Soobrian was served with a notice to appear, charging that he was
removable for having committed an aggravated felony. He appeared in immigration court
in Fishkill, New York, while he was serving his sentence on the New York felony. He
was excluded from the courtroom because his frequent outbursts were disrupting the
hearing. The IJ, proceeding in Soobrian’s absence, determined him to be removable, and
3

denied withholding of removal.1 This decision was affirmed by the BIA in late 2003. At
that time, Soobrian had completed the New York sentence and was in the custody of the
Department of Homeland Security in York County, Pennsylvania.
Under the then-applicable law, he filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in early 2004. Soobrian and the United States Attorney’s Office
entered into a stipulation granting him a de novo immigration hearing, specifying that he
would not be excluded from the new hearing and that he would receive proper medication
to ensure his attendance at that hearing.
B.

Immigration proceedings leading to this petition for review
1.

Initial hearings before the IJ result in CAT protection, but not
withholding of removal

At the new hearing in May 2005, Soobrian conceded removability and filed a
motion for a competency hearing and an indefinite continuance until his competency
could be determined. These motions were denied by the IJ, who granted a continuance
until September 2005 to aid preparation. In September, the IJ heard testimony and
argument on the claims for relief. Two witnesses testified at the hearing. First,
Soobrian’s mother (Ambrosine Ramberan) testified regarding his mental illness. Second,
an expert witness (Jason Calder) testified as to the likely consequences of removing

1

The Administrative Record reflects that Soobrian had counsel at this first hearing
and his family testified on his behalf. The IJ noted that this satisfied 8 C.F.R. § 240.4, the
regulation (identical to § 1240.4) applicable to removal proceedings at the time. A.R.
834.
4

Soobrian to Guyana. Calder’s testimony was accepted without opposition from the
Government. Soobrian did not testify because his counsel “believe[d] there [we]re
competency issues in this case,” and he did not believe Soobrian was “competent to
testify or accurately recollect what happened that day [of the offense].” A.R. 571–72.2
Soobrian’s mother testified that his mental problems began to develop in his teens.
He would talk about Jesus Christ and God and the end of the world (believing himself to
be Jesus at times), not eat, and not bathe. He would sleep on park benches and beg for
food and money on the streets even though he was living with his family. On one
occasion, he completely disrobed in public. He was frequently hospitalized. Ms.
Ramberan testified that she would receive calls from the New York City Police
Department on occasion when Soobrian acted inappropriately and was taken to a
psychiatric hospital. She also testified that he is not generally violent, and that on
medication he is a different person who is “beautiful, presentable.” Soobrian has
difficulty caring for himself, including feeding, clothing, and medicating himself (he
often resists taking his medication), and she testified that there are no family members or
ties to support Soobrian in Guyana.
Calder testified and submitted an affidavit. He opined that it was more likely than

2

Soobrian’s testimony on what happened on the day of the offense would have
been relevant to determine whether the aggravated felony was a “particularly serious
crime” that would bar withholding of removal on persecution grounds. As discussed
below, the IJ found the offense to be not “particularly serious” and the BIA did not
disturb this ruling, so any additional testimony from Soobrian was ultimately
unnecessary.
5

not that Soobrian would be abused at the hands of police or government officials if
removed to Guyana. He based this opinion on three factors: (1) Soobrian’s mental health;
(2) his status as a returning criminal deportee; and (3) his Indo-Guyanese ethnicity. He
stated that, due to Soobrian’s lack of family in Guyana and the state of mental healthcare
there, Soobrian “would probably wind up on the streets and in an indigent status.” He
also testified that Soobrian would likely end up in Georgetown, a majority AfroGuyanese city, and, furthermore, that he would be “red flagged” as a deportee with a
violent criminal conviction (though he would not be automatically detained upon his
arrival).3 Calder stated that the most likely way Soobrian would draw the attention of
under-equipped, poorly trained, and poorly disciplined police would be if he “act[ed]
out.” He also stated that beatings were not uncommon, and he believed it was more likely
than not that Soobrian would be abused in some fashion at the hands of police or
government officials, noting that it was a question of “when,” not “if,” Soobrian would be
detained. Calder also testified to some of the more extreme responses to criminal
deportees, relating reports that government officials were accused of forming death
squads to target known or suspected criminals for extrajudicial execution, though he
stated the more direct response was for police to have a heightened violent response
against suspected or known criminals.
The IJ issued a detailed nine-page opinion. He determined that the conviction was

3

Soobrian would be “red flagged” as a criminal deportee due to Guyana’s Crime
Prevention Act of 2002.
6

not a “particularly serious crime” and thus Soobrian could pursue withholding of removal
and CAT protection. However, the IJ denied Soobrian withholding of removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b) because neither his ethnicity nor his status as a criminal deportee
justified it. Soobrian’s ethnicity did not justify withholding because the record did not
support a finding that Indo-Guyanese as a group suffer persecution in Guyana. Also, his
status as a criminal deportee did not justify withholding because criminal deportees are
not a cognizable social group.
The IJ, however, granted CAT protection after noting that “torture is not
synonymous with ‘persecution,’ although there may be an over-lapping of violence which
may encompass both actions.” He took special note of the lack of a requirement that
violence be “on account of” a particular ground to qualify for CAT protection (assuming
the rest of the definition of torture was met). Turning to the evidence of record, the IJ
recognized that the Government had argued that Soobrian would only come to the
attention of the police if he acted out, but rebutted this argument by pointing both to
Soobrian’s history of acting out even when well medicated and the expert witness’s
testimony that Soobrian inevitably will come to the attention of police and suffer at their
hands. The IJ further recognized that, when off medication, Soobrian had committed
various non-violent acts that drew the attention of the NYPD over the years, including
proclaiming himself to be Jesus and disrobing in public. Looking to the record evidence
of conditions in Guyana, the IJ concluded that Soobrian would not be able to take care of
himself, would not be able to obtain shelter or medications, and will be confronted by the
7

police. Furthermore, citing to the expert testimony, the IJ found that the State
Department Country Report supported the conclusion that torture occurred in detention in
Guyana because it acknowledged that mistreatment of prisoners continues to be a
problem, with little progress made by the Guyanan government in pursuing alleged
abuses. The IJ noted that it was “inevitable” that Soobrian would encounter police, and
he would “likely . . . suffer intentional severe abuse . . . [that] constitutes torture under
applicable case law.” The IJ concluded by noting that Soobrian need not prove that he
will be tortured, only that it is likely, and granted CAT protection.
2.

The BIA upholds the denial of withholding of removal, and it
reverses the grant of CAT protection

In March 2006, the BIA issued a split decision affirming the IJ’s denial of
withholding of removal on persecution grounds, affirming the IJ’s decision to proceed
with the removal hearing without granting a continuance, and reversing the IJ’s grant of
CAT protection.
On the persecution claims, the BIA agreed with the IJ that any mistreatment
Soobrian might experience “as a result of his mental illness or criminal deportee status []
would not constitute persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground.” The BIA
also upheld the IJ’s determination “that there was no evidence to establish [that Soobrian]
was likely to be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of
persecutory motives against the Indo-Guyanese ethnicity as a whole.” Therefore, the BIA
agreed with the IJ that Soobrian had “failed to carry his burden of proving a clear
8

probability of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”
As for Soobrian’s mental competency, the BIA found that the IJ conducted the
proceedings in accord with procedural safeguards and regulations. It claimed to lack
jurisdiction to consider whether the regulations relating to incompetent aliens are
unconstitutional.
Addressing the CAT claim, the BIA held that the IJ’s “conclusion that [Soobrian]
is likely to be imprisoned and tortured upon his return to Guyana is clearly erroneous.” It
noted that the evidence did not establish that it was more likely than not that Soobrian
would be imprisoned and tortured, citing to a State Department Country Report, and
stated that there was “no evidence that the authorities intentionally create and maintain
[poor prision] conditions in order to inflict torture.” The BIA therefore “f[ou]nd clear
error in the [IJ]’s factual determinations,” and vacated the grant of CAT protection. One
BIA member dissented; she would have affirmed the grant of CAT protection because she
discerned no clear error in the IJ’s factual findings.
3.

Petition for review and unopposed remand

Soobrian filed a timely petition for review in our Court. In November 2006,
pursuant to an unopposed motion, we remanded the matter to the BIA for consideration of
whether the class of mentally ill persons is a “particular social group” for purposes of
withholding of removal and to clarify the standard of review used to decide whether
Soobrian established that he was “more likely than not” to be tortured if removed.
9

4.

The BIA’s actions on remand

On remand, the BIA addressed three issues: (1) whether Soobrian was a member
of a particular social group of “mentally ill persons”; (2) its standard of review in
determining whether Soobrian met the legal standard for establishing eligibility for CAT
protection; and (3) clarification of its reasons for reversing the IJ’s grant of CAT
protection.
On the first issue, the BIA determined that the IJ did not specifically address the
particular social group of “mentally ill persons,” and it remanded to the IJ to make
relevant findings of fact and to enter a legal determination on the issue in the first
instance.
As for the second issue, the BIA reversed the statement made in its March 2006
opinion. Even though that decision purported to apply a “clearly erroneous” standard of
review, in a footnote it noted that its earlier opinion had “mistakenly stated that ‘the
Immigration Judge’s conclusion that [Soobrian] is likely to be imprisoned and tortured
upon his return to Guyana is clearly erroneous.’ Such a predication as to the probability
of future torture is a mixed question of law and fact, which [it] review[s] de novo.” App.
91 n.1 (emphases in original).
Finally, the BIA clarified that it reversed the IJ because a State Department report
“indicated that there were no reported incidents or evidence of torture and that, although
the country report indicated that poor prison conditions exist in Guyana, there was no
evidence that authorities intentionally created and maintained such conditions in order to
10

inflict torture.” However, because two intervening decisions were not available to the
IJ—Matter of J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006), and Lavira v. Attorney General,
478 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007)4—the BIA remanded to the IJ “for a new decision on
[Soobrian’s] application for protection under the Convention Against Torture.”
5.

IJ again grants CAT protection and again denies withholding of
removal

On remand, the IJ received additional briefing and re-evaluated the withholding of
removal and CAT claims. In a second written decision, the IJ again denied withholding
of removal and again granted CAT protection.
Addressing the withholding-of-removal claim, the IJ only considered whether
relief could be granted on the ground of “membership in a particular social group” of
“mentally ill persons” under our Fatin jurisprudence and the BIA’s Acosta precedent.5
He noted that there was little precedent on this issue, but nonetheless found the record
“supportive of [Soobrian’s] claimed social group.” The IJ concluded that (1) mental
illness was an immutable characteristic; (2) it was fundamental to the identity of mentally
ill persons and could not be changed; and (3) the evidence was “sufficient[] [to]

4

Lavira, however, was later overruled by Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d
180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
5

This line of cases requires that the common characteristic that defines the group
be “one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to
change[,] because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Fatin v.
I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
233 (BIA 1985)).
11

establish[] that mentally ill Guyanans are readily visible within that country’s society.”
However, even though the IJ found a cognizable social group, he also held that the
record did not support a finding of any persecutory intent on the part of the Guyanese
government because “the record shows little more than that Guyana cannot afford better
medical services, or at worst, simply chooses not to expend much of its limited resources
on the mentally ill. While either scenario is regrettable, they do not equate to
persecution.” The IJ also determined that the record did not establish that the Guyanese
government was unwilling or unable to control private actors from targeting the mentally
ill because, while it was unable to protect every mentally ill person, it arrested and
charged perpetrators who attacked the mentally ill.
Revisiting the prior grant for CAT protection, the IJ found the following facts to be
supported by the record:
-

-

Soobrian is profoundly mentally ill and on a strict daily regimen of
medications;
even while medicated, it is difficult for him to carry on even a
minimally coherent conversation;
while normally non-violent, he has a conviction for assault even
while medicated;
he has no relatives residing in Guyana
Guyana’s mental health care system is woefully inadequate and large
segments of the mentally ill population have little or no access to
appropriate medical care or housing;
his eventual arrest by the police is almost certain;
his certain exposure to arrest and detention will likely result in the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering at the hands of the
police, prison guards, or fellow prisoners without prison authority
interference when, due to a total lack of proper, daily medications, he
will unlikely be capable of obeying or understanding orders and
directives from authorities.
12

Acknowledging the BIA’s admonition to adhere to J–F–F–, the IJ found that each step of
the inferential chain was supported by the evidence and reinstated the grant of CAT
protection. The IJ also clarified his finding that Soobrian was likely to be subjected to
torture at the hands of Guyanese authorities “was not based on the austere prison or
detention conditions in Guyana, nor on the ‘wil[l]ful blindness’ of Guyanan government
authorities to [Soobrian’s] torture,” addressing the concerns of our intervening opinion in
Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
6.

The BIA again upholds the denial of withholding of removal and
again reverses the grant of CAT protection

The BIA issued its last decision in November of 2008. It addressed only the issues
it remanded to the IJ: (1) Soobrian’s claim that he is a member of a particular social group
of mentally ill persons for purposes of withholding of removal; and (2) clarification of the
IJ’s grant of CAT protection in light of intervening precedent from our Court and the
Attorney General.
On the first issue, it “f[ou]nd no legal error in the Immigration Judge’s conclusion
that [Soobrian] failed to sustain the high burden of proof applicable to withholding of
removal.” It also did not “find clear error in the factual findings leading up to that
determination.” It did not decide whether the IJ was correct in determining that “mentally
ill persons” was a particular social group, but instead held that, even if it were cognizable,
the IJ was correct in “finding that [Soobrian] ha[s] not demonstrated a sufficient
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likelihood of persecution on account of his membership in such group . . . . [because he]
has not reasonably shown that the Guyanese government’s lack of adequate mental health
resources is motivated out of an intent to harm its mentally ill citizens.” The BIA also
upheld the IJ’s determination that “the record does not support [Soobrian’s] claim that he
would be subjected to harm by groups that the Guyanese government is either unable or
unwilling to control.”
On the second issue, it disagreed with the IJ’s finding that Soobrian faces a clear
probability of torture in Guyana. It cited to Matter of V–K–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 (BIA
2008), and reviewed the IJ’s finding de novo. Citing to Matter of J–F–F–, the BIA
“disagree[d] with the Immigration Judge’s determination that a preponderance of the
evidence establishes that every step in [the] hypothetical chain of events [supporting CAT
relief] is more likely than not to happen, let alone that the entire chain will come together
to result in the probability of torture of [Soobrian].” It noted that while the expert
testified that “[Soobrian’s] eventual arrest is almost certain, on this record it is far from
clear whether [Soobrian’s] behavior . . . would bring [about] the . . . eventual torture of
[Soobrian].” It further held that even if Soobrian were to be arrested, the evidence was
“not alone sufficient to demonstrate that [his] prospective torturer will have the required
specific intent of inflicting severe pain or suffering.”
Accordingly, the BIA again affirmed the IJ’s decision on withholding of removal,
but again reversed his decision on CAT protection. It ordered Soobrian removed, and this
timely petition for review followed.
14

II.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) over the timely petition for

review of the final order of removal by the BIA.
When the BIA issues its own decision, we typically review that decision and not
the IJ’s decision, Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009), but when the
BIA relies on the IJ’s decision and partially reiterates the IJ’s discussion in its decision,
we review both decisions, Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009). We
have jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).
We will review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to the principles of
deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984). Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184; see also Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d
Cir. 2006). Under the REAL ID Act, factual or discretionary determinations are outside
of our scope of review because Soobrian is removable by virtue of having committed an
aggravated felony. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184. Questions of law and constitutional claims
remain within our scope of review. Id.
III.

Discussion
Soobrian raises three claims in his petition for review: (1) he is entitled to

withholding of removal because he is mentally ill, Indo-Guyanese, and would be a
criminal deportee; (2) the BIA improperly disturbed the IJ’s decision on Soobrian’s CAT
claim by not reviewing factual findings for clear error; and (3) Soobrian should have been
15

granted a mental competency evaluation to determine if he understood the nature of the
proceedings. We grant the petition for review on the CAT claim only, and deny the
petition for review on the remaining claims.
A.

Soobrian’s persecution claims do not warrant withholding of removal

An alien may not be removed to a country where his or her “life or freedom would
be threatened . . . because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group,6 or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To the extent
that we consider persecution “on account of” a protected ground, we require that the
persecutor be motivated, at least in part, by a protected ground. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003). The alien has the burden of proof and must show that it is
“more likely than not that he will face persecution” if removed. See Ambartsoumian v.
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 88–89 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).
Aliens who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and are a danger
to the community of the United States are not eligible for withholding of removal on
these grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). The IJ found Soobrian’s convictions not to

6

To qualify for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) as a member
of a “particular social group,” an alien must: (1) identify a group that constitutes a
“particular social group”; (2) establish that he or she is a member of that group; and (3)
show that he or she was persecuted “on account of” membership in that group. Fatin, 12
F.3d at 1240. The “‘particular social group’ must exist independently of the persecution
suffered by the applicant for [withholding of removal],” Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172, and
generally requires that the common characteristic that defines the group be one that the
members of the group cannot change or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences, Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
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constitute a “particularly serious crime” and considered him eligible for withholding of
removal, and the Government did not appeal this ruling.
Soobrian alleges three persecution bases justifying withholding of removal: (1) his
Indo-Guyanese ethnicity; (2) his membership in the “particular social group” of criminal
deportees; and (3) his membership in the “particular social group” of mentally ill people.
As we discuss below, we discern no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Soobrian is not
entitled to withholding of removal on any of these three grounds.
Soobrian additionally claims that we must evaluate these three bases in the
aggregate such that, even if each basis were not alone sufficient to justify withholding,
their combination would entitle him to withholding of removal. We reject this assertion.
Logically, if he is not persecuted on each individual ground, then he is not persecuted on
all three grounds.
1.

Ethnicity

Soobrian fails to point to any evidence in the record in support of his first basis for
withholding of removal, his Indo-Guyanese ethnicity, aside from the conclusory
statement that Afro-Guyanese police are more likely to target him. However, the IJ noted
that Indo-Guyanese tend to be in a position of power in Guyana (in contrast to workingclass Afro-Guyanese), and in any event did not make the factual finding that he would be
targeted. Based on this record (and pursuant to the REAL ID Act, we cannot review the
facts), Soobrian is not entitled to withholding of relief on this ground.

17

2.

Criminal deportees

Soobrian’s second basis for withholding of removal, membership in the particular
social group of criminal deportees, fails because, as we held in Toussaint v. Attorney
General, 455 F.3d 409, 418 (3d Cir. 2006), “criminal deportees are not recognized as a
social group.” In Elien v. Ashcroft, a decision we relied on in Toussaint, the First Circuit
Court upheld the BIA’s refusal to recognize criminal deportees as a particular social
group because, “in general, [a country] has a legitimate national interest in protecting its
citizens from increased criminal activity.” 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, even if Guyanese law targets individuals with criminal
records for additional scrutiny, Guyana has a legitimate national interest in protecting its
citizens from known criminals, and the BIA did not err in ruling that they did not
comprise a cognizable social group.
3.

Mentally ill people

Soobrian’s mental illness also fails as a reason to withhold removal because he has
not demonstrated that he would be persecuted “on account of” his mental illness. As the
BIA assumed it was a cognizable social group, we do the same, but even with this
assumption the alleged persecution appears to be a simple lack of resources for the
mentally ill in Guyana, not an intent on the part of the government to persecute mentally
ill persons. Indeed, the IJ found that there was no intent to harm mentally ill persons, just
a regrettable lack of resources.
Although we recognize as not implausible Soobrian’s argument that the lack of
18

resources may be because the Guyanese government does not want to help the mentally
ill, he is essentially asking us to second-guess the government’s allocation of its scarce
resources between the mentally well and the mentally ill. Were a disproportionate
allocation of scarce resources alone sufficient to be deemed persecution, we would
necessarily become entangled in matters of international budgetary analysis. We decline
the invitation.
B.

The BIA applied an incorrect standard of review on the CAT claim

To obtain withholding of removal under the CAT, “[t]he burden of proof is on the
applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In this case, the
IJ found that Soobrian had met this burden of proof, issuing a detailed opinion in which
he made specific factual findings from the record of witness testimony and documentary
evidence. The IJ concluded that Soobrian was more likely than not to be tortured if
removed to Guyana.
The BIA reversed the IJ’s grant of CAT protection by applying a de novo standard
of review and reversing the IJ’s factual findings. As already noted, it initially applied the
“clearly erroneous” standard in an earlier opinion, but later expressly disavowed that
statement and instead asserted that it had the authority to review mixed questions of fact
and law de novo.
This was error. A prediction as to the probability of future torture is a mixed
question of law and fact, but as we stated in Kaplun (reversing the BIA’s conclusion in
19

Matter of V–K–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500), the BIA must “break down the inquiry into its
parts and apply the correct standard of review to the respective components.” Kaplun v.
Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). Where, as here, the IJ finds that each step
in an inferential chain culminating in “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering
. . . [is] clearly supported by th[e] record” and is more likely than not to happen, App. 80,
the BIA may only disturb these factual findings if they are clearly erroneous. Absent that,
the BIA may only reverse the grant of CAT protection if the facts as found by the IJ do
not meet the legal definition of torture as defined under governing law.
We also note that, in reviewing for clear error, the BIA should bear in mind the
difference between its standard of review and that of the Attorney General. See Board of
Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
54,878, 54,891 (Aug. 26, 2002) (“[T]he Attorney General . . . adopt[ed] a ‘clearly
erroneous’ standard for the Board, but use[s] a de novo standard himself in reviewing the
Board’s determination.”). Thus, in applying Matter of J–F–F–, the BIA must still give
deference to the IJ’s findings of fact on both (1) the individual links in his chain of events
being more likely than not to happen, and (2) the entire chain being more likely than not
to happen. While in J–F–F– the Attorney General was within his power to reject the
“speculat[ions]” of the alien that were made “[a]t the Immigration Judge’s urging,” id. at
921, without any deference to the IJ, the BIA is not in a comparable position. The BIA
must give deference to an IJ’s factual determinations, including causal chains, and may
only reverse if they are clearly erroneous. It did not give correct deference here, and thus
20

we grant the petition for review on the CAT claim.
C.

Soobrian’s due process rights were not violated

Soobrian also claims that he was denied due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment when he was forced to proceed at the removal hearing without an indefinite
continuance7 or a determination of his competency. We disagree; Soobrian was afforded
all the procedural protections provided for in the governing statutes and regulations
“The Fifth Amendment’s due process protections apply to aliens in removal
proceedings.” Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). We have held that “due process requires that aliens threatened with removal are
provided the right to a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence on their behalf.” Id. Under our immigration laws, there is only a
passing reference to an alien’s mental competency at a removal hearing. “If it is
impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to be present at
the proceeding, the Attorney General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and
privileges of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3).
The Attorney General promulgated a regulation that outlines the “safeguards to

7

To the extent that Soobrian argues that the IJ abused his discretion in not granting
a continuance, we disagree. Soobrian did, in fact, receive a continuance to prepare for the
removal hearing. Although he desired an indefinite continuance “to such time as he
would be deemed competent to communicate with counsel and understand the nature of
the proceedings,” because (as we explain below) Soobrian did not need to be competent
nor present at the removal hearing, it could not be an abuse of discretion to deny the
indefinite continuance.
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protect the rights and privileges of the alien.” It reads:
When it is impracticable for the respondent to be present at the hearing
because of mental incompetency, the attorney, legal representative, legal
guardian, near relative, or friend who was served with a copy of the notice to
appear shall be permitted to appear on behalf of the respondent. If such a
person cannot reasonably be found or fails or refuses to appear, the custodian
of the respondent shall be requested to appear on behalf of the respondent.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.4. Thus, the Attorney General contemplated that proceedings could go
forward against incompetent aliens, even in their absence, provided that certain
procedural safeguards were afforded. As noted, these safeguards are designed to provide
aliens with “a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence on their behalf.”
We are aided by an instructive case from the Tenth Circuit Court, Brue v.
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). There, the Court noted that, “contrary to the
. . . due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant is entitled, removal proceedings may go forward against incompetent
aliens” provided they are given a full and fair hearing with an opportunity to present
evidence. Id. at 1233 (citations omitted); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1038 (1984) (“Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that
apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a [removal] hearing.”). Though we
need not reach the issue here, the Brue Court also noted that “the statute and the
regulation facially appear to require no procedural safeguards if an unrepresented,
mentally incompetent alien is nevertheless able to be present at his removal proceeding.”
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Brue, 464 F.3d at 1233. Given that reading, it concluded that the IJ in that case “had no
obligation under either the statute or the regulation to consider [the alien]’s mental
competency because the procedural safeguards they envision were already in place” by
virtue of the presence of counsel. Id.
Likewise, Soobrian was afforded all the procedural protections envisioned by the
statute and the regulation. Not only was he actually present at the hearing, he was
represented by competent counsel, his mother was present to safeguard his interests, his
mother testified on his behalf (relaying his personal history), and an expert witness also
testified on his behalf (relaying information about Guyana). Indeed, if Soobrian could be
absent from the hearing so long as he was represented in accordance with the regulation,
he certainly could be present at the hearing with the same safeguards in place.
Further, even were there a deficiency in the process afforded him, Soobrian cannot
show the “substantial prejudice” required for a successful due process challenge. See
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). His mother testified to his
personal history, his mental illness, his difficulties taking care of himself, his run-ins with
the police, and the lack of anyone to care for him in Guyana. His expert witness testified
as to the potential consequences of removal, focusing on the nature of mental health care
in Guyana as well as other on-the-ground conditions. His attorney filed briefs, made
arguments, questioned witnesses, and was successful in convincing the IJ to grant relief to
Soobrian. Simply put, the removal proceedings “provided [him] the . . . full and fair
hearing that allow[ed] [him] a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on [his]
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behalf.” Cabrera-Perez, 456 F.3d at 115; see also Brue, 464 F.3d at 1234 (“[T]he
removal proceedings provided [the alien] with the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.”). Soobrian has not made any showing as to what
prejudice he suffered by not having a competency hearing or an indefinite continuance.
Accordingly, his due process claim fails.
* * * * *
We agree with the BIA that Soobrian is not entitled to withholding of removal.
We also agree that there was no denial of due process. However, the BIA applied an
incorrect standard of review with respect to his CAT claim, and we therefore grant the
petition for review on that claim only and remand for further proceedings.
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